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IS THERE A PHYSICALITY REQUIREMENT AT COMMON 
LAW?: A SURVEY OF THE PRE-NRDC CASES DISCUSSING 
‘MANUFACTURE’ 
 
 
BEN MCENIERY* 
 
Abstract 
 
One of the fundamental issues that remains unresolved in patent law today, both in 
Australia and in other jurisdictions, is whether an invention must produce a physical 
effect or cause a physical transformation of matter to be patentable, or whether it is 
sufficient that an invention involves a specific practical application of an idea or 
principle to achieve a useful result. In short, the question is whether Australian patent 
law contains a physicality requirement. Despite being recently considered by the 
Federal Court, this is arguably an issue that has yet to be satisfactorily resolved in 
Australia. In its 2006 decision in Grant v Commissioner of Patents, the Full Court of 
the Federal Court of Australia found that the patentable subject matter standard is 
rooted in the physical, when it held that an invention must involve a physical effect or 
transformation to be patent eligible. That decision, however, has been the subject of 
scrutiny in the academic literature. This article seeks to add to the existing literature 
written in response to the Grant decision by examining in detail the key common law 
cases decided prior to the High Court’s watershed decision in National Research 
Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents, which is the undisputed 
authoritative statement of principle in regards to the patentable subject matter 
standard in Australia. This article, in conjunction with others written by the author, 
questions the Federal Court’s assertion in Grant that the physicality requirement it 
established is consistent with existing law. 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a generally held belief that the patent system exists to promote the invention 
of new and useful physical machines and devices and new methods that physically 
transform matter from one state into another. What is not so well understood is 
whether, and to what extent, non-physical methods, being those that do not involve a 
machine or other physical device and those that do not involve a physical 
transformation of matter, are patent eligible. In other words, there is uncertainty as to 
whether patent law contains a physicality requirement. 
 
From its earliest days, the objective of patent law has been to encourage the 
introduction of new technologies by providing incentives to invent and invest in 
innovation.1 In Australia, it has traditionally been thought that patents are the domain 
                                                 
* BA LLB (Hons) (UQ) LLM (QUT) PhD (QUT), Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Queensland 
University of Technology. 
1 This is a concept that dates back to the early patent custom in the Venetian Republic: Giulio Mandich, 
‘Venetian Patents (1450-1550)’ (1948) 30 Journal of the Patent Office Society 166 (Frank D Prager, 
trans, 1936) [trans of Rivista di Diritto Commerciale]; Giulio Mandich, ‘Venetian Origins of Inventor’s 
Rights’ (1960) 42 Journal of the Patent Office Society 378 (Frank D Prager trans, 1958) 101 [trans of 
Rivista di Diritto Industriale]; Edward C Walterscheid, ‘The Early Evolution of the United States 
Patent Law: Antecedents (Part 1)’ (1994) 76 Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society 697, 
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of engineering, applied science and industrial manufacturing. This traditional 
conception of the role of the patent system, inherited from mid-19th century British 
law, involves an assumption that patent protection is limited to the creation of 
physical articles and methods that involve a transformation of matter.2 These 
expectations are arguably a consequence of our understanding of the notion of 
technology as being something necessarily tied to machines, physical devices and 
physically transformative methods.3 However, it is by no means certain that the law is 
concordant with these traditional expectations, for tying patentable subject matter to 
the physical in this way ties the patent system to industrial and pre-industrial notions 
of patentability in ways that are inconsistent with the need for the patent system to be 
able to respond appropriately to new and ‘excitingly unpredictable’ technologies as 
they arise.4 
 
Increasingly, competitive commercial advantage in today’s modern economies will 
come from new and innovative business processes. It is then of little surprise that this 
issue has come to the fore at the dawn of the Information Age, as it is highly likely 
that much of the groundbreaking innovation we are likely to witness in the 
‘knowledge economy’ of the Information Age will involve the use and manipulation 
of information and data rather than the use and manipulation of physical matter.5 
Whether Australian patent law will keep pace with this altered reality is as yet 
unknown. The early indication is that it will not, at least initially.  
 
The Australian courts have to date had one dealing with attempts by patentees to 
expand the bounds of patentable subject matter beyond the realms of engineering, 
applied science and industrial manufacturing. In its 2006 decision in Grant v 
Commissioner of Patents,6 the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia asserted 
that, if an invention is to satisfy the patentable subject matter test, it must result in the 
production or alteration of a physical object or produce a physically observable 
                                                                                                                                            
709-710; Frank D Prager, ‘A History of Intellectual Property from 1545 to 1787’ (1944) 26 Journal of 
the Patent Office Society 711, 715, 750.   
It is also evident in the early English custom of granting monopolies and the English common law: 
Darcy v Allen (The Case of Monopolies) (1603) 11 Co Rep 84b; 77 ER 1260; Statute of Monopolies 21 
Jam 1, Ch 3 (1623) (Eng). It is also evident today: Fritz Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent 
System (1958) US Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, 2d Sess., 36-8; Roberto Mazzoleni and Richard 
R Nelson, ‘The Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate’ 
(1998) 27 Research Policy 273 (who describe three different theories that address three different 
aspects of the broad incentive theory; Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2001) 315 (‘[i]n this sense, patents act as a vector that links scientific and 
technical research with commercial spheres.’). 
2 The King v Wheeler (1819) 2 B & Ald 345, 349; 106 ER 392, 394-395; Lionel Bently and Brad 
Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (2001) 310 (‘the image of the invention as the human intervention 
into nature that brings about a resulting physical change that underpins much contemporary 
jurisprudence, was well entrenched in British law by the mid-nineteenth century.’). 
3 Ben McEniery, ‘The Patentability of Non-Physical Inventions: Lessons From the United States’ 
(2009) 35(2) Monash University Law Review 376, 377-8. 
4 The need for the patent system to be able to respond appropriately to new and ‘excitingly 
unpredictable’ technologies as they arise is documented by the High Court of Australia in National 
Research Development Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1959) 102 CLR 252, 271. 
5 John Maddox, What Remains to Be Discovered: Mapping the Secrets of the Universe, the Origins of 
Life, and the Future of the Human Race (1998) 375-376; James Canton, The Extreme Future (2006) 
75-78; Richard Watson, Future Files: A History of the Next 50 Years (2007). 
6 (2006) 154 FCR 62 (‘Grant’) (Heerey, Kiefel and Bennett JJ).The matter was heard on appeal from a 
decision of a single judge of the Federal Court of Australia: (2005) 67 IPR 1 (Branson J). 
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effect.7 While the Court accepted that business methods are not excluded from patent 
eligibility as a category subject matter, it found that a business method removed from 
any physical apparatus or other physical embodiment is not patentable.8 
 
The alleged invention considered in Grant is a method to protect an asset from the 
claims of creditors. It comprises creating a trust, the person making a gift of money to 
the trust, the trustee lending a sum of money to the person, and the trustee securing 
the loan by taking a charge over the asset. The object is to establish in favour of the 
trustee a charge over the asset in priority to other creditors.9 This is an unconventional 
use of the patent system in that it seeks to reserve the ability to apply certain aspects 
of the law in a particular way to achieve a useful result to one individual. This is an 
alleged invention that does not disclose a physical aspect and does not involve a 
physical transformation of matter. In essence, the Court concluded that any method 
that does not produce a physical result is merely ‘intellectual information’, which has 
never been patentable.10 
 
The Grant case has been criticised in the academic literature on the grounds that its 
reasoning is fundamentally inconsistent with the principles set out in the High Court’s 
landmark decision in National Research Development Corporation v Commissioner 
of Patents.11 It has been argued that the High Court in NRDC explained that the 
patentable subject matter inquiry is a broad test that recognises all new and useful 
innovation as patent eligible, regardless of whether it involves a physical embodiment 
or a transformation of physical matter.12  
 
In its reasons for decision, the Full Court asked whether the alleged invention before 
it is a proper subject of letters patent according to the principles which have 
developed over time to inform the application of section 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies. The Court examined a line of cases dating back prior to NRDC and 
observed that the patentability of an invention that does not produce a physical effect 
or cause a physical transformation of matter has never been upheld.13 From its 
                                                 
7 Grant (2006) 154 FCR 62, 70 [30], [32], 73 [47]. 
8 Ibid 73 [47]. 
9 Australian Innovation Patent No. 2003100074 (‘Asset Protection Method’) (filed Feb. 7, 2003). 
10 Grant v Commissioner of Patents (2006) 154 FCR 62, 66-68 [14]–[23]. 
11 (1959) 102 CLR 252 (‘NRDC’). 
12 For a critique of the Grant decision see Ben McEniery, ‘Patents for Intangible Inventions in 
Australia After Grant v Commissioner of Patents (Part 1)’ (2007) 13(2) Computer and 
Telecommunications Law Review 70; Ben McEniery, ‘Patents for Intangible Inventions in Australia 
After Grant v Commissioner of Patents (Part 2)’ (2007) 13(3) Computer and Telecommunications Law 
Review 100. See also: Ann Monotti, ‘The Scope of ‘Manner of Manufacture’ Under the Patents Act 
1990 (Cth) After Grant v Commissioner of Patents’ (2006) 34 Federal Law Review 461; McEniery, 
‘The Patentability of Non-Physical Inventions: Lessons From the United States’, above n 3; Charles 
Lawson, ‘Grant v Commissioner of Patents and Patenting Knowledge Inventions’ (2008) 15 Journal of 
Law and Medicine 626. For a critique of the physicality requirement created by the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit in the United States in In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. Oct 31, 2008) (en 
banc), see Benjamin J McEniery, ‘The Federal Circuit in Bilski: The Machine-or-Transformation Test’ 
(2009) 91 Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society 254. Note that the Federal Circuit’s 
physicality requirement was subsequently overturned by the United States Supreme Court in Bilski v 
Kappos, 561 US ___ (2010) [Editor: please insert page number when it becomes available]. 
13 The court considered: Burroughs Corp (Perkins’) Application [1974] RPC 147; Commissioner of 
Patents v Lee (1913) 16 CLR 138; Commissioner of Patents v Microcell Ltd (1959) 102 CLR 232; 
International Business Machines Corporation’s Application [1980] FSR 564; International Business 
Machines Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1991) 33 FCR 218; Neilson v Minister of Public 
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observations, the Court inferred that non-physical methods are categorically excluded 
from patent eligibility.14  
 
One question the existing literature does not systematically address is whether the 
Federal Court’s finding in Grant is actually consistent with the decisions in the cases 
that preceded NRDC. This article aims to fill that gap by examining whether there is 
anything in the pre-NRDC case law to support the finding in Grant that Australian 
patent law contains a physicality requirement, or whether that case law supports a 
patent eligibility standard free of physical constraints.15 Its focus is the relevant case 
law from its inception in Boulton and Watt v Bull16 in the late 18th century until the 
decision in NRDC, and it questions whether the Federal Court’s application of 
principle in Grant was justified in light of existing precedent. The purpose of 
conducting an analysis of this sort is to gain a better understanding of the law as it 
stood at the time NRDC was handed down and to uncover the principles of law that 
are of continuing significance today. 
 
Conducting an analysis of this sort requires an examination of the history of 
patentability since the enactment of the Statute of Monopolies.17 Included in this 
discussion is a consideration of the pre-1977 case law from the United Kingdom,18 
and the Australian case law to date. This is an inherently difficult undertaking since 
many of the earlier cases were decided at a time when it was thought technology is 
grounded in physical artefacts and today’s computing and information processing 
technologies had not yet been imagined. Essentially, what is sought is language in the 
jurisprudence to indicate whether judges over time have been open to the possibility 
that patent eligible technology might exist in a form that is free of physical or 
corporeal embodiment.  
 
II PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER: THE ‘MANNER OF MANUFACTURE’ TEST 
 
The patentable subject matter inquiry in Australia finds its statutory basis in s 18(1) of 
the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) and the definition of ‘invention’.19 
                                                                                                                                            
Works (NSW) (1914) 18 CLR 423; Re Brown (1899) 5 ALR 81; Re Cooper’s Application for a Patent 
(1901) 19 RPC 53; Re ESP’s Application (1944) 62 RPC 87; Re Fishburn’s Application (1938) 57 RPC 
245; Re GEC’s Application (1942) 60 RPC 1; Re Johnson’s Application for a Patent (1901) 19 RPC 
56; Re Lenard’s Application (1954) 71 RPC 190; Re W’s Application (1914) 31 RPC 141; Rogers v 
Commissioner of Patents (1910) 10 CLR 701. The court noted that in NRDC, an artificial effect was 
physically created on the land, and that in each of Welcome Real-Time v Catuity Inc, CCOM v Jiejing 
and in the United States decisions of State Street Bank & Trust Co v Signature Financial Group and 
AT&T Corp v Excel Communications, Inc, there was a component physically affected or a change in 
state or information in a part of a device or machine. 
14 McEniery, ‘Patents for Intangible Inventions in Australia (Part 2)’, above n 11, 102.  
15 In actual fact, the author does not adhere strictly to this classification, as passing reference is made to 
cases that follow the 1959 NRDC decision, such as Rolls-Royce Limited’s Application [1963] RPC 251. 
Although it is acknowledged that this case was decided after NRDC, the judicial approach it 
demonstrates is arguably consistent with pre-NRDC thinking on the nature of patentable subject matter. 
16 (1795) 126 ER 651 (Eyre CJ, Buller, Heath, Rooke JJ). 
17 21 Jam 1, Ch 3 (1623) (Eng). The Statute of Monopolies is the short title of the Act. The long title is 
‘An Act Concerning Monopolies and Dispensations with Penal Laws and the Forfeiture Thereof’. 
18 The reason for tracing United Kingdom law only to 1977 is that 1977 is the year the United 
Kingdom abandoned its Statute of Monopolies-based regime for a new patent system modelled on the 
Convention on the Grant of European Patents, opened for signature 5 October 1973, 13 ILM 268 
(entered into force 7 October 1977) (EPC). See Patents Act 1977 (UK) c 37. 
19 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 18 and Schedule 1 (which defines ‘invention’). 
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Section 18 provides that, where a standard patent is concerned,20 an ‘invention’ is 
patentable if it: is a ‘manner of manufacture’ within the meaning of s 6 of the Statute 
of Monopolies; is novel; involves an inventive step, is useful; and has not been used in 
secret. Section 18 does not expressly require that an invention produce a physical 
effect or cause a physical transformation of matter, nor does it expressly exclude these 
things from the test for determining patentability. 
 
Of the s 18 heads of patentability, the focus of this article is the ‘manner of 
manufacture’ requirement, which determines the scope of the subject matter for which 
a patent can be granted. Only if an invention is within the scope of patentable subject 
matter, does it then need to be tested against the remaining heads of patentability, 
such as novelty and inventive step. The requirement that an invention, to be a 
patentable invention, must be a ‘manner of manufacture’ stems from s 6 of the Statute 
of Monopolies. This section, purportedly in accordance with the common law in 
existence at the time of its enactment in 1623, rendered void all monopolies provided 
that the invalidating provisions of the statute: 
 
shall not extend to any [letters] Patents and Graunt of Privilege for the tearme 
of fowerteene yeares or under, hereafter to be made of the sole working or 
makinge of any manner of new Manufactures within this Realme, to the true 
and first Inventor and Inventors of such Manufactures, which others at the 
tyme of makinge such [letters] Patents and Graunts shall not use, soe as alsoe 
they be not contrary to the Lawe nor mischievous to the State, by raising 
prices of Commodities at home, or hurt of Trade, or generallie inconvenient. 
 
The principal purpose of the Statute of Monopolies was to declare grants of 
monopolies void.21 However, while the Statute of Monopolies reflected the common 
law’s suspicion of monopolies, it recognised nonetheless that monopolies limited in 
duration have the potential to serve the public interest by providing an incentive to 
invent. Thus, the Statute of Monopolies is a prohibition on the Crown granting 
monopolies, other than those in respect of inventions. 
 
How the incorporation by reference of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies in modern 
Australian patent statutes is to be interpreted was made clear by the High Court of 
Australia in the NRDC decision.22 In NRDC, the Court considered the operation of the 
                                                 
20 There are two types of patents in Australia: standard patents and innovation patents. Standard patents 
confer monopoly protection for a term of 20 years: Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 67. Innovation patents, 
which require a significantly lesser degree of inventiveness, are awarded for a term of 8 years: Patents 
Act 1990 (Cth) s 68. The innovation patent is a second-tier patent introduced into Australian law by the 
Patents Amendment (Innovation Patents) Act 2000 (Cth). The innovation patent replaced the petty 
patent and is designed to meet the needs of small and medium enterprises for inexpensive and easily 
acquired short-term patent protection for modest technological advances or incremental inventions. 
21 Section 1 of the Statute of Monopolies provides that the central objective of the statute is to 
encourage free trade and competition by rendering void all monopolies, including those granted under 
the authority of letters patent. Section 1 provides: ‘All monopolies and all commissions, grants, 
licenses, charters and letters patent heretofore made or granted or hereafter to be made or granted to 
any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate whatsoever, of or for the sole buying, selling, 
making, working or using of anything within this realm… shall be utterly void and of no effect.’. 
22 Grant (2006) 154 FCR 62, 64 [7]. Barwick CJ in Joos v Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 CLR 
611, 616 described the case as a ‘watershed’. According to the Full Court of the Federal Court in 
CCOM v Jiejing (1994) 122 ALR 417, 443: ‘the decision changed the direction of the case law not 
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Statute of Monopolies in relation to the former patents legislation, the Patents Act 
1952 (Cth). There the Court explained that the relevant question to be asked when 
determining whether an invention is patentable subject matter is: ‘Is this a proper 
subject of letters patent according to the principles which have been developed for the 
application of s 6 of the Statute of Monopolies?’23 What the Court meant is that the 
scope of patentable subject matter is to be determined by reference to what has been 
deemed to be patentable by the courts over time. Therefore, any understanding and 
consideration of the concept and how it is to be applied to new forms of invention 
requires an analysis of that body of case law. 
 
From its analysis of that case law, the Court embraced the view that ‘manner of 
manufacture’ is a broad, flexible and dynamic concept, the meaning of which has 
evolved, and will continue to evolve, over time.24 It said that the principles are to be 
applied flexibly, as technological advancement is ‘excitingly unpredictable’ and that it 
is not appropriate to attempt to reduce the patentable subject matter test to ‘an exact 
verbal formula’:25  
 
The purpose of s 6, it must be remembered, was to allow the use of the 
prerogative to encourage national development in a field which already, in 
1623, was seen to be excitingly unpredictable. To attempt to place upon the 
idea the fetters of an exact verbal formula could never have been sound. It 
would be unsound to the point of folly to attempt to do so now, when science 
has made such advances that the concrete applications of the notion which 
were familiar in 1623 can be seen to provide only the more obvious, not to say 
the more primitive, illustrations of the broad sweep of the concept.26 
 
Instead, the Court said that the expression is a general title to be interpreted in 
accordance with the purpose of the Statute of Monopolies and in line with common 
law principles established for the application of that purpose: 
 
The inquiry which the definition demands is an inquiry into the scope of the 
permissible subject matter of letters patent and grants of privilege protected by 
the section. It is an inquiry not into the meaning of a word so much as into the 
breadth of the concept which the law has developed by its consideration of the 
text and purpose of the Statute of Monopolies. One may remark that although 
                                                                                                                                            
only in Australia but also in the United Kingdom.’. See also, Sam Ricketson, ‘Business Method 
Patents: A Matter of Convenience? (The Stephen Stewart Memorial Lecture 2002)’ (2003) 2 
Intellectual Property Quarterly 97, 107. According to Andrew Christie, NRDC should be labelled as a 
‘bombshell’ rather than a watershed because it has completely annihilated the test for inherent 
patentability and that ‘there is no meaningful inherent patentability requirement operating under 
Australian law’: ‘Some Observations on the Requirement of Inherent Patentability in the Context of 
Business Method Patents’ (2000) 40 Intellectual Property Forum 16, 20. 
23 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 269. 
24 Ibid 270 (the court noted that in Maeder v Busch (1938) 59 CLR 684, 706, Dixon J said that a 
widening conception of the notion of patentable subject matter has been a characteristic of the growth 
of patent law). Similarly, the High Court in Lockwood Security Products Pty Ltd v Doric Products Pty 
Ltd (2007) 235 CLR 173, 201 [66], by way of obiter dicta, recognised that since the growth of patent 
law demands it, ‘any attempt to fetter the exact meaning of “a manner of new manufacture” could 
never be sound’ citing Maeder v Busch (1938) 59 CLR 684, 706 (Dixon J) and NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 
252, 271. 
25 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 271 (cited and followed in Grant (2006) 154 FCR 62, 64-65 [7]-[8]). 
26 Ibid 271. 
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the Statute spoke of the inventor it nowhere spoke of the invention; all that is 
nowadays understood by the latter word as used in patent law it comprehended 
in ‘new manufactures’. The word ‘manufacture’ finds a place in the present 
Act, not as a word intended to reduce a question of patentability to a question 
of verbal interpretation, but simply as the general title found in the Statute of 
Monopolies for the whole category under which all grants of patents which 
may be made in accordance with the developed principles of patent law are to 
be subsumed.27 
 
In explaining the scope of manner of manufacture, the Court said that to be 
patentable, an invention must be an artificially created state of affairs that is of 
economic significance, meaning that its value to the country must be in the field of 
economic endeavour, and that it must have ‘an industrial or commercial or trading 
character’.28 Further, it said the invention must offer some advantage that is material 
in the sense that it must be part of the ‘useful arts’ rather than the ‘fine arts’:29 
 
The point is that a process…must be one that offers some advantage which is 
material, in the sense that the process belongs to a useful art as distinct from a 
fine art.30  
 
The Court identified several categories of excluded matter to aid in distinguishing 
patentable from non-patentable subject matter. It made clear that patents protect new 
inventions and not discoveries, be they discoveries of the laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, or abstract ideas.31 In regard to the distinction between unpatentable 
discoveries and patentable inventions the Court said this: 
 
There may indeed be a discovery without invention – either because the 
discovery is of some piece of abstract information without any suggestion of a 
practical application of it to a useful end, or because its application lies outside 
the realm of ‘manufacture’.32 
                                                 
27 Ibid 269. 
28 Ibid 275-7. 
29 For a view on the prohibition on patenting the fine arts see: Ben McEniery, ‘“Storyline Patents”: Are 
Plots Patentable?’ (2009) 33(1) Melbourne University Law Review 291. 
30 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 275 citing Re Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corporation's Application 
(1958) RPC 35, 36. 
31 Ibid 262-4. In this regard, Australian law seems to replicate the United States position. Examples of 
laws of nature include Sir Isaac Newton’s observations on the law of gravity and Albert Einstein’s 
general theory of relativity, while abstract ideas include novel and useful mathematical formulae: 
Diamond v Chakrabarty, 447 US 303, 309 (1980); Diamond v Diehr, 450 US 175, 185 (1981). By way 
of a recent Australian example, in Re Milton Edgar Anderson (2008) 78 IPR 449 the Deputy 
Commissioner of Patents upheld the view that alleged inventions that relate to a mere scientific theory 
or discovery of the laws of nature without a specific practical and useful application are not a ‘manner 
of manufacture’. The application in question relates to ‘the new science of subtronics’ and ‘a new law 
of electric induction’. The applicant indicated that the inventive concept is the ‘revelation and 
utilisation of an antimatter voltage force that stems from the discovery of electrosubtronic fields and 
culminated in the new science of subtronics’. The Deputy Commissioner held that the invention 
claimed is a scientific theory or discovery of the laws of science without a specific practical and useful 
application and that, if a specific application were claimed, such an invention is not fully described. 
32 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 264. Laws of nature and physical phenomena are not patentable 
because the discovery of a law of nature, a principle of physical science, or a natural phenomenon is 
not an invention made by man. Thus, a new mineral discovered in the Earth or a new plant found in the 
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It has been argued in the literature that the NRDC Court’s broad and expansive 
statement of principle precludes any suggestion that the patentable subject matter test 
might involve a physicality requirement,33 and that accordingly the Federal Court’s 
finding in Grant is inconsistent with the High Court precedent it was bound to 
follow.34 The argument then is that the dividing line between what is a patentable 
invention and what is a non-patentable abstract idea is not physicality. 
 
As the Court in NRDC intended to consolidate rather than rewrite the law,35 a 
comprehensive exploration of relevant principle requires that regard be had not to 
NRDC alone, but also to the cases that preceded it. Addressing these earlier cases is 
the objective of this article. As stated above, this article examines the cases that 
preceded NRDC with a view to identifying statements of principle that shed light on 
the issue of whether Australian patent law contains a physicality requirement. That 
analysis of the case law follows in the next section.  
 
III PRE-NRDC CASES DISCUSSING ‘MANNER OF MANUFACTURE’ 
 
A Boulton and Watt v Bull 
 
Judicial consideration of inherent patentability begins with the 1795 decision of 
Boulton and Watt v Bull.36 Boulton and Watt v Bull is the first substantive English law 
decision to consider what an invention is and what the limits of the scope of 
patentable subject matter are.37 Chief Justice Eyre noted that the law at the time did 
not contain guidance to inform this issue. 
 
Though we have had many cases upon patents yet I think we are here upon 
ground which is yet untrodden, at least was untrodden till this cause was 
instituted, and till the discussion were entered into which we have heard at the 
bar, and now from the court. Patent rights are no where that I can find 
accurately discussed in our books.38 
 
The case involved a challenge to a patent held by James Watt, which broadly claimed 
a method of reducing the consumption of steam, and consequently, fuel in steam 
engines (then called fire-engines).39 The invention was an improvement on existing 
steam engine technology. Watt’s improvement was to have the condenser in a 
separate vessel from the steam cylinder. The method was described in the 
specification as the application of certain principles of nature in way to achieve its 
purpose. The method involved keeping the engine cylinder hot by insulating it, and by 
                                                                                                                                            
wild is not patentable subject matter. Also excluded are methods of calculation, theoretical schemes 
(including business schemes and abstract plans): Grant [(2006) 154 FCR 62, 66 [16]. 
33 McEniery, ‘Patents for Intangible Inventions in Australia (Part 1)’, above n 11.   
34 McEniery, ‘Patents for Intangible Inventions in Australia (Part 2)’, above n 11. 
35 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 269.  
36 (1795) 126 ER 651 (Eyre CJ, Buller, Heath, Rooke JJ).  
37 Prior to Boulton and Watt v Bull, questions as to patentable subject matter had arisen in two cases 
that concerned additions to known machinery, but did not expressly consider whether an invention 
must have a physical aspect: Morris v Bramsom (1776) G 311 (NP); R v Arkwright (1785) 1 Web Pat 
Cas 64 (KB). 
38 Boulton and Watt v Bull (1795) 126 ER 651, 665 (Eyre CJ). 
39 Ibid 667 (Eyre CJ). 
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providing a separate vessel, which was kept cool, and within which the steam was to 
be condensed. This new method avoided the heat loss suffered when the steam was 
condensed in the cylinder itself.40  
 
The Court construed the issue to be resolved as being whether the alleged invention is 
a patentable process or merely an unpatentable ‘principle’. If the alleged invention 
were nothing more than a principle, the patent would be invalid for lack of patentable 
subject matter. This was a contentious question as the patentability of processes, as 
opposed to new machines or chemical substances, had not previously been considered 
and upheld in a court of law. The judges of the Court of Common Pleas who heard the 
case were divided equally 2-2 on this point. Chief Justice Eyre along with Rooke J 
held the patent to be valid, while Heath and Buller JJ held it to be invalid.  
 
While the judges all appeared to agree that there can be no patent for a mere principle, 
they differed as to how this rule was to be applied. Chief Justice Eyre understood a 
‘principle’ to be an ‘abstract notion’,41 as distinct from a ‘practical manner of 
doing’,42 while for Rooke and Buller JJ, it was an elementary truth of the arts and 
sciences.43 Heath J was alone in taking the view that the prohibition on patenting 
‘principles’ extends to preclude patenting methods of production and even patents on 
the application of a principle.44  
 
On the physicality front, the involvement of some physical substance was for Heath 
and Buller JJ the basis for determining whether the invention is an abstract principle 
or patentable subject matter. According to Heath J, the term ‘manufacture’ is 
reducible to two classes: vendible machines or (chemical) substances,45 both of which 
are objects of definite physical form. For Heath J, unless the method resulted in a 
vendible machine or substance, a patent could not be supported, and if it did so result, 
the patent would be for the vendible machine or substance and not the method itself.46 
By way of example, his Honour regarded ‘patents for chemical processes’ as being in 
truth ‘for a vendible substance’.47 In a similar fashion, but excluding the requirement 
for vendibility, Buller J agreed, opining that the scope of patent eligibility extends 
only as far as inventions embodied in mechanical and chemical forms.48 Both Heath 
and Buller JJ, whose views would not accommodate the patentability of processes that 
make use of an existing engine, found the patent to be invalid.49  
 
In contrast, Eyre CJ considered that the expression ‘any manner of new manufacture’ 
bore a much wider meaning. The Chief Justice held that it would apply to things 
made, the practice of making (thereby endorsing the patentability of processes), and 
principles reduced to practice in a new manner (thereby endorsing the patentability of 
                                                 
40 Ibid 668. 
41 Ibid 667 (Eyre CJ). 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid 659 (Rooke J), 662 (Buller J). 
44 Ibid 661 (Heath J). 
45 Ibid 660-1. 
46 Ibid 661. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid 662-3.  
49 Ibid 660-1 (Health J), 664-5 (Buller J). 
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non-physical processes).50  
 
It was admitted in the argument at the Bar, that the word manufacture in the 
statute was of extensive signification, that it applied not only to things made, 
but to the practice of making, to principles carried into practice in a new 
manner, to new results of principles carried into practice. Let us pursue this 
admission. Under things made, we may class, in the first place, new 
compositions of things, such as manufactures in the most ordinary sense of the 
word; secondly, all mechanical inventions, whether made to produce old or 
new effects, for a new piece of mechanism is certainly a thing made. Under 
the practice of making we may class all new artificial manners of operating 
with the hand, or with instruments in common use, new processes in any art 
producing effects useful to the public.51 
 
Chief Justice Eyre, unlike Heath J, noted that a patent for a method involving no new 
‘mechanism’ and producing no new result would necessarily be for the method itself, 
that is, for the ‘method detached from all physical existence whatever’.52 He endorsed 
the view that abstract principles are not patentable and drew a connection between 
patentable subject matter and physical or corporeal objects or substances: 
 
Undoubtedly, there can be no patent for a mere principle, but for a principle so 
far embodied and connected with corporeal substances as to be in a condition 
to act, and to produce effects in any art, trade, mystery, or manual occupation, 
I think there may be a patent. … It is not that the patentee has conceived an 
abstract notion that the consumption of steam in fire-engines may be lessened 
but he has discovered a practical manner of doing it; and for that practical 
manner of doing it he has taken this patent. Surely this is a very different thing 
from taking a patent for a principle; it is not for a principle, but for a process.53 
 
Although the focus of his Honour’s judgment is upon mechanical and chemical 
devices and methods, there is nothing to indicate that he considered the concept to be 
limited to those objects. Indeed, his Honour’s explanation of patentable processes 
(‘the practice of making’) was so broad as to include ‘any art producing effects useful 
to the public’.54 The extent of the Chief Justice’s reasoning in this regard is that 
processes involving principles embodied in physical or corporeal objects or 
substances are patentable subject matter, rather than abstract ideas. This however, 
does not mean his Honour contemplated that patent eligibility was so limited. There is 
nothing in his reasoning that indicates that non-physical processes are necessarily 
abstract ideas or principles, or that non-physical processes are for any other reason 
excluded from patentability. At no stage did his Honour attempt to explain 
exhaustively what an abstract idea or principle is, other than to say that reduction to 
practice is what distinguishes an abstract idea or principle from a patentable process.55  
                                                 
50 Ibid 666. See also 667, at which Eyre CJ regarded the view that methods of production were 
unpatentable as contradicted by the evidence in the patents granted since 1623, ‘three-fourths’ of which 
were likely to have been for methods of operating and manufacture ‘producing no new substances and 
employing no new machinery.’). 
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid 667.  
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid 666. 
55 Ibid 667.  
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Accordingly, his Honour’s view cannot be interpreted as favouring a physicality 
requirement. In fact, there is nothing to suggest that his Honour contemplated the 
exclusion of non-physical inventions from patentability. Instead, both the Chief 
Justice and Rooke J indicated that patent eligibility turns on a principle being reduced 
to a specific practical application capable of producing effects that are of benefit to 
the public.56 This is a position, which is as true today as it was then, that leaves open 
the possibility that non-physical inventions have being recognised as being patent 
eligible since the earliest judicial consideration of the ‘manner of new manufacture’ 
standard.57 
 
Justice Rooke saw no difficulty with process patents or patents to improvements on 
existing technologies.58 By focusing on the mechanical nature of the improvement, he 
allowed the patent, having determined that the invention claimed is more than a mere 
principle. Rather, Rooke J considered the claimed invention to be a principle reduced 
to a practical application.59 His Honour said nothing to indicate that producing a 
physical effect or causing a physical transformation of matter is what distinguishes 
the abstract from the non-abstract. 
 
The same James Watt patent considered in Boulton and Watt v Bull was re-litigated 
four years later in an action on the case in Hornblower v Boulton.60 There the Court 
unanimously found in favour of the patentee and upheld the patent and confirmed the 
reasons and decision of Eyre CJ.  
 
In the words of Kenyon CJ, the Court rejected the principal objection that the patent 
claimed is a patent for a ‘philosophical principle’ only.61 Kenyon CJ understood 
‘manufacture’ as meaning ‘something made by the hands of man.’62 Grose J agreed, 
finding that ‘Mr. Watt had invented a method of lessening the consumption of steam 
and fuel in [steam] engines’, and this was ‘not a patent for a mere principle, but for 
the working and making of a new manufacture within the words and meaning of the 
statute.’63  
 
Despite the finding in Hornblower v Boulton, it is widely accepted that it was not 
until 1842 that it was finally settled in Crane v Price,64 that the term ‘manufacture’ 
used in the Statute of Monopolies is used in a dual sense, which comprehends both a 
process and a product.  
 
                                                 
56 Ibid 659-660 (Rooke J), 668 (Eyre CJ). 
57 This view is supported by Pila: Justine Pila, ‘Inherent Patentability in Anglo-Australian Law: A 
History’ (2003) 14 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 109, 116. 
58 Boulton and Watt v Bull (1795) 126 ER 651, 659. 
59 Ibid 659-660. 
60 (1799) 8 TR 95; 101 ER 1285. 
61 Ibid 1288 (Kenyon LCJ). 
62 Ibid (Kenyon LCJ) (‘But having now heard everything that can be said on the subject, I have no 
doubt in saying that this is a patent for a manufacture, which I understand to be something made by the 
hands of man.’). 
63 Ibid 1290-1 (Grose J). Watt’s steam engine patent was extended for 25 years by an Act of Parliament 
in 1775: 15 Geo. III c. 61: An Act for vesting in James Watt, engineer, his executors, administrators, 
and assigns, the sole use and property of certain steam engines, commonly called fire engines, of his 
invention, described in the said Act throughout His Majesty's dominions, for a limited time. 
64 (1842) 4 Man & G 580; 134 ER 239.  
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B The King v Wheeler 
 
The distinction between patentable manufactures and unpatentable ‘principles’ 
articulated in Boulton and Watt v Bull and Hornblower v Boulton was confirmed in 
the nineteenth century in The King v Wheeler.65 The patent considered in The King v 
Wheeler concerned a new method of drying and preparing malt. It was controversial 
because no new machine was involved. The patent in question was declared void on 
the ground that the specification did not adequately describe the claimed invention.66  
 
In the course of giving judgment for the Court, Abbott CJ described the concept of 
‘manufactures’ in the following terms. 
 
Now the word ‘manufactures’ has been generally understood to denote either a 
thing made, which is useful for its own sake, and vendible as such, as a 
medicine, a stove, a telescope, and many others, or to mean an engine or 
instrument, or some part of an engine or instrument, to be employed, either in 
the making of some previously known article, or in some other useful purpose, 
as a stocking frame, or a steam engine for raising water for mines. Or it may 
perhaps extend also to a new process to be carried on by known implements, 
or elements, acting upon known substances, and ultimately producing some 
other known substance, but producing it in a cheaper or more expeditious 
manner, or of a better and more useful kind. But no merely philosophical or 
abstract principle can answer to the word ‘manufactures’. Something of a 
corporeal and substantial nature, something that can be made by man from the 
matters subjected to his art and skill, or at the least some new mode of 
employing practically his art and skill, is requisite to satisfy this word.67 
 
From this statement it is clear that his Honour considered new physical objects and 
physically transformative processes as the basis of what has been ‘generally 
understood’ to constitute patentable subject matter. However, as with Eyre CJ in 
Boulton and Watt v Bull, it cannot be said that he saw the involvement of a physical 
substance as a prerequisite to patentability.  
 
In this respect, his Honour considered the distinction between patentable subject 
matter and an unpatentable ‘philosophical or abstract principle’ as involving 
something broader than a physicality requirement. In the quote above, his Honour 
gave three distinct examples of patentable subject matter, namely, ‘[s]omething of a 
corporeal and substantial nature’, ‘something that can be made by man from the 
matters subjected to his art and skill’, and ‘or at the least of some new mode of 
                                                 
65 (1819) 2 B & Ald 345; 106 ER 392. For further nineteenth century consideration of the distinction 
between patentable inventions and abstract ‘principles’, see Househill Iron Co v Neilson (1843) 9 Cl & 
Fin 78; 8 ER 616, where the House of Lords confirmed the approach taken by Alderson B in Jupe v 
Pratt (1837) 1 Web Pat Cas 145 that all abstract principles may be patentable, subject to their having 
been directed to a practical application (which was described as being having been ‘turned to account’ 
through ‘direction to the actual business of human life’). The House of Lords drew a distinction 
between an abstract principle and the same principle when connected with some ‘special purpose or 
practical operation’, which was capable of supporting a patent. Only when an abstract principle had 
been ‘clothed with the language of practical application’ could it be regarded as ‘an invention, in the 
patent law sense of the term’. 
66 Ibid 351-2. 
67 Ibid 394-5. 
 13
employing practically his art and skill’.68 By his Honour’s use of the conjunction ‘or’ 
it is clear that these three examples are alternatives, rather than an aggregate. It is the 
inclusion of the last of these examples, which indicates that his Honour considered 
that the concept of manufacture might extend beyond things of a ‘corporeal and 
substantial nature’ such as processes devoid of physical elements. 
 
C Cooper’s Application 
 
Re Cooper’s Application for a Patent,69 decided in 1901, involved a patent 
application for an improved form of newspaper featuring a blank space along which 
the page could be folded to avoid the trouble of reading over the folded part of the 
paper.70 
 
In allowing an appeal from the decision of the Comptroller-General below, the 
Attorney-General Sir Robert Finlay held the invention to be patentable subject matter 
because it involves an ‘invention with reference to a manufacture’ that results in ‘a 
material product of some substantial character’.71 In reaching his conclusion, the 
Attorney-General approved the Comptroller’s direction that: 
 
A Patent may be properly refused in any case in which no material product of a 
substantial character is realised or effected by the alleged invention, or in which 
the only material product is a printed sheet, or its equivalent, and the only 
alleged invention an arrangement of words, or the like, upon such sheet.72 
 
In response to this direction, he distinguished a manufacture resulting in a material 
product from what might be described today as an unpatentable abstract business 
idea: 
 
You cannot have a Patent for a mere scheme or plan – a plan for becoming rich; 
a plan for the better Government of a State; a plan for the efficient conduct of 
business. The subject with reference to which you must apply for a Patent must 
be one which results in a material product of some substantial character. The 
specification must show how some such material product is to be realised or 
effected by the alleged invention.73 
 
He then said that a patent might be properly refused if: 
 
the case is one in which the only material product is a printed sheet, or its 
equivalent, and the only alleged invention an arrangement of words or the like 
upon such sheet.74 
 
                                                 
68 Ibid. 
69 (1901) 19 RPC 53 (‘Cooper’s Application’). 
70 Ibid 54. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. For a statement as to the correctness of the Attorney-General’s quotation see Re an Application 
for a Patent by Fishburn (‘Fishburn’s Application’) (1938) 57 RPC 245, 246-7 (which involved a 
patent being allowed for an invention that consisted of arranging information on each end of a cinema 
ticket so that it could be torn in half). 
73 Cooper’s Application (1901) 19 RPC 53, 54. 
74 Ibid. 
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However, he held that the application before him was of a different kind, being more 
than just a literary arrangement of words on a page.  
 
The present Applicant in no way proposes to arrange printed matter for its more 
convenient use from a literary point of view. What he proposes is a particular 
way of manufacturing a newspaper; and the alleged utility of his supposed 
invention is purely mechanical. It in no way is analogous to the arrangement of 
an index, or the arrangement of any other production of a literary kind, which 
may enable the reader more readily to appreciate the sense of the author.75 
 
Thus, he focussed on the fact that ‘the alleged utility of [the] supposed invention is 
purely mechanical’.76 He described the invention as a new type of newspaper, which 
is clearly a physical article of manufacture and an artificial product.77 The Attorney-
General pointed out that he did not see any difference between this new form of 
newspaper and ‘a proposal for so binding a book that it opens comfortably and 
conveniently for the reader’ so as to make it ‘physically more convenient for use’.78 
 
The Attorney-General’s judgment contains three statements of legal principle. The 
first is a general exclusion of abstract plans and schemes from patentability. The 
second is that excluded from patentability are processes not involving something 
‘which results in a material product of some substantial character’.79 The third is that 
an alleged invention will be patentable if it is something of a mechanical nature. 
 
Given that the word ‘material’ comes from the Latin ‘materialis’, adjective of the 
Latin ‘materia’, meaning matter, it could be that by his reference to the need for a 
‘material product’, the Attorney-General was in favour of a physicality requirement. 
This view is supported by Pila, who contends that Attorney-General saw the concept 
of ‘manufacture’ as being something that requires ‘the production of a physical 
artificial object.’80 The alternative is that ‘a material product of some substantial 
character’ merely indicates that something other than an abstract principle is required. 
Given the ambiguity that exists, it cannot be said one way of the other whether the 
Attorney-General was in favour of a physicality requirement. 
 
D Rogers v The Commissioner of Patents 
 
                                                 
75 Ibid 54-5. 
76 Ibid 54. 
77 Ibid 55. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid 54. 
80 Pila, above n 57, 135. According to Pila the view expressed by the Attorney-General in Cooper’s 
Application was consistently confirmed in subsequent cases heard prior to 1959. Pila also cited two 
early cases which effectively pre-empted modern decisions which found that there is no business 
method exception to patentability, namely: Fishburn’s Application (1938) 57 RPC 245, 248 (finding 
that whilst a ‘mere scheme or plan’ is inherently unpatentable, an alleged invention does not become 
such a scheme or plan merely because the mechanical purpose it serves is a purpose that has useful 
results in the carrying on of a branch of business); and Re an Application for a Patent by Cobianchi 
(Cobianchi UK) (1953) 70 RPC 199, 200 (finding a collocation of playing cards to be more than a 
mere ‘idea or plan’ by virtue of its possession of ‘something more than the sum of its individual 
parts.’).  
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Rogers v The Commissioner of Patents,81 is an example of the tensions that exist 
between narrow conceptions regarding the patentability of methods and the 
emergence of contemporary notions of broad subject matter. The case involved a 
method of burning timber by causing a self-feeding slow fire to act continuously 
against the side of a tree.  
 
The High Court by majority denied the patent, seemingly on the basis that it 
considered the invention to be trivial. Chief Justice Griffth was of the view that the 
patent ought to be denied because the method claimed is merely ‘a direction how best 
to use materials in everyday use to achieve an everyday object’.82 Justice O’Connor 
objected to the patent on the basis that he considered that it produced nothing new. In 
his view, the result of the process is that ‘no machine is made—nothing is invented, 
nothing is produced’83 and that is absurd to describe an improved method of building 
a log fire as a patentable invention.84 Justice O’Connor was seemingly of the view 
that the law requires that an invention disclose a physical aspect to be regarded as 
patentable.85 
 
The decision, however, is of interest because it contains the strong dissent of Isaacs J, 
who rejected the majority’s conception of patentable subject matter and took the view 
that the ingenuity of the method claimed in conjunction with its economic and 
practical significance made it patentable subject matter.86 In doing so, his Honour 
dispelled any notion that an invention might not be deserving of a patent on subject 
matter grounds, without having recourse to its novelty, on the suggestion that what is 
claimed is an ‘attempt to claim an every day practice’:87 
 
Why is this contrivance not of the nature of an invention? Why is it to be 
treated as if it were an absurd attempt to claim an every day practice, say of 
lighting the kitchen fire, or striking a match? ... It involves an idea, and a 
modus operandi... It is objected that to grant Rogers a patent for this would 
prevent a land owner from adopting the expedient. If this is an objection a 
great proportion of the patents in existence should never have been granted. ... 
The mere fact of simplicity, and that the expedient looks obvious now to those 
who have become acquainted with it for the first time, does not destroy its 
inventive character.88 
 
It would appear that his Honour was aware of the significance of the majority’s 
narrow conception of the patentable subject matter standard when he said, ‘the 
principle upon which this case is decided appears to me to affect not merely the 
                                                 
81 (1910) 10 CLR 701 (Griffith CJ and O’Connor J, and Isaacs J dissenting). 
82 Ibid 709 (Griffiths CJ). 
83 Ibid 710 (O’Connor J). 
84 Ibid 712 (O’Connor J). 
85 Ibid (‘The proposition that a patent may be granted for a new method of producing an old result in a 
more efficient and more economical manner must therefore be qualified by the condition that the new 
method must either produce some vendible article or must be carried out by some mechanical 
contrivance or some substance the use or adaptation of which for the purpose of working the new 
method is part of the invention.’). 
86 Ibid 718 (Isaacs J) (dissent). 
87 Ibid 715-6. 
88 Ibid. 
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present and future applications, but also the possible validity of many existing 
patents’.89 
 
His Honour’s dissent arguably brought to light new thinking about the patent system 
and its ability to reach into what might be thought to be everyday activities that would 
later be adopted by the courts, namely that the focus of the patentable subject matter 
inquiry is on new and ingenious subject matter, rather than physically-observable 
results.90  
 
E Re C & W’s Application 
 
Re C & W’s Application91 was the first case in which a medical procedure patent was 
considered in England. It concerned a method of extracting lead from people suffering 
lead poisoning.  
 
The Solicitor-General, Sir Stanley Buckmaster, held that the method was ineligible 
for patent protection because he believed that it did not involve the manufacture or 
sale of a ‘commercial product’ or something of ‘commercial value’.92  
 
A manner of new manufacture may be a thing newly made, or a substance 
which, if made before, is improved in its manufacture; or, quite apart from 
that, it may be a machine or a process that can be used in making something 
that is, or may be, of commercial value.93 
 
Rather than focussing on a physicality requirement, the Solicitor-General was 
concerned only that an invention be ‘in some way associated with commerce and 
trade.’94 It is arguable that by his use of the word ‘may’, he viewed patentable subject 
matter as being of broad compass. While the words, ‘something newly made’ and 
‘substance’ indicate a reference to physical objects, the use of the word ‘may’ 
indicates that the Solicitor-General merely gave examples of patentable subject 
matter, rather than a hard-and-fast rule.  
 
The Solicitor-General did not consider that policy arguments against the patenting of 
methods of treating the human body ought to affect the decision in a case such as this: 
 
It has been urged, and I think quite rightly, that the question of humanity 
ought not to affect the decision in such a case as this. I agree. Of course, it is 
well known that the medical profession do all in their power to discourage 
members of their body from obtaining protection for any discovery that has 
for its object the alleviation of human suffering, and it is impossible to speak 
too highly of such conduct, but it cannot affect my judgment in arriving at a 
                                                 
89 Ibid. 
90 See also, Commissioner of Patents v Lee (1913) 16 CLR 138 (Isaacs J). 
91 (1914) 31 RPC 235.  
92 Ibid 235-6. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid 235. 
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conclusion upon the terms of the Section of the Act of Parliament, and I have 
altogether excluded such considerations from my mind.95 
 
However, in the Solicitor-General’s opinion, the fact that a human being could be 
considered to be something that could be improved by the method did not make it one 
‘of manufacture or of trade’, even though a human may be a better working organism 
when a poisonous quantity of lead is extracted.96 Although, he thought that if the 
process were applied ‘for the purpose of removing lead from animals in order to make 
them better marketable products, it might be that different considerations would 
apply’.97 Arguably, the Solicitor-General here confused the vendibility of the subject 
of the process with the vendibility of the process itself. 
 
In any event, regardless of the propriety of the exception to patent eligibility of 
methods of medical treatment of humans, the Solicitor-General’s opinion does seem 
to support the absence of a physicality requirement in favour of an association with 
‘commerce and trade’. 
 
F Maeder v Busch 
 
In Maeder v Busch,98 the High Court of Australia considered a patent for a cosmetic 
method of treating the human body to cause a permanent waving of human hair. The 
method was rejected for want of novelty by reason of prior common knowledge and 
prior public use, in accordance with the trial judge’s findings.99 None of the judges 
hearing the case considered that the issue of whether the subject matter of the 
invention was patentable was one that needed to be decided.100 
 
Despite this, the decision contains obiter dicta of Dixon J on the manner of 
manufacture issue. His Honour made known his opinion that the result of a patented 
method must be the production, treatment of, or effect upon, some tangible thing: 
 
Applications of old things to a new use, accompanied by the exercise of 
inventive power, are often patentable though there be no production of a new 
thing. But in every case the invention must refer to and be applicable to a 
tangible thing. A disembodied idea is not patentable.101 
 
                                                 
95 Ibid 236; cf Schering AG’s Application [1971] RPC 337 (in which Graham and Whitford JJ 
expressed as obiter an opinion that the decision in Re C & W’s Application was correct, but held that a 
contraceptive process could not be described as a treatment of disease and thus the claim fell outside 
the prohibition on patenting methods of medical treatment of humans). See also A & H’s Application 
(1927) 44 RPC 298, 298 (dealing with the patentability of a contraceptive device) (‘I am a Court of 
Law, and not a Court of Morality’). 
96 Re C & W’s Application (1914) 31 RPC 235, 236. The Solicitor-General’s reasoning in this regard is 
now seen as being too narrow after the High Court’s NRDC decision: Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Limited 
v Rescare Limited (1994) 122 ALR 141; Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v FH Faulding & Co Ltd 97 FCR 
524, 563 [114], 567 [130]-[131] (Finkelstein J). 
97 Re C & W’s Application (1914) 31 RPC 235, 236. 
98 (1938) 59 CLR 684 (Latham CJ, Dixon, Evatt, McTiernan JJ). 
99 Ibid 699 (Latham CJ), 699-700 (Dixon J), 707 (Evatt J), 708 (McTiernan J). 
100 Ibid 699 (Latham CJ), 707 (Dixon J), 707 (Evatt J), 708 (McTiernan J). 
101 Ibid 705 citing Edmunds and Bentwich, Copyright in Designs (1908, 2nd ed) 20, 21 (citations 
omitted). 
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In applying the law to the patent at hand, Dixon J put the question, ‘[c]an the 
discovery or improvisation of a mere process or method of treating any corporeal part 
of the human being afford subject matter for a patent?’102 While his Honour left this 
question unanswered, he did explain the arguments in favour of distinguishing 
treatment of the human body for an increase in ‘pride or appearance’ say ‘for use in 
ordinary trade or business such as that of hairdressing, manicure, pedicure’, and 
surgical methods to improve ‘physical welfare’. He hinted that the first would be 
patentable subject matter as they reflect a manual art or craft even though no 
‘substance or thing forming a possible subject of commerce or a contribution to the 
productive arts is to be brought into existence by means of or with the aid of the 
process’. He ruled, following Re C & W’s Application, that the second would not be 
patentable as they were thought to be essentially non-economic.103  
 
G Fishburn’s Application 
 
Re an Application for a Patent by Fishburn104 is an early case that pre-empted the 
modern decisions refuting the business method exception to patentability.105 
 
The case concerned a patent entitled, ‘Improvements related to tickets and the like.’ It 
involved the design of a printed ticket in such a way as to be capable of being divided 
into at least two portions, either transversely or longitudinally, such that each portion 
would bear all the essential printed information of the ticket including an identifying 
serial number. This design would allow a doorman or a machine to tear the ticket in 
half and return one half to the ticket holder and retain the other, leaving both parties 
with ticket stubs that contain all the essential information commonly printed on 
tickets.  
 
In reaching the conclusion that the ticket design is patentable subject matter, Morton J 
held, in respect of printed matter, that Sir Robert Finlay’s judgment in Cooper’s 
Application: 
 
should not be read as a direction that a patent should be refused in every case 
in which the only material product is a printed sheet, ticket, coupon, or its 
equivalent and the only alleged invention is an arrangement of words or the 
like upon that sheet.106 
 
In his Honour’s opinion, the decisive factor was that the alleged invention served a 
‘mechanical purpose’ and it did not lose this character merely because it had utility in 
carrying on a business.107 He indicated that while a mere scheme or plan is inherently 
                                                 
102 Ibid 705. 
103 Ibid 706-7 citing Re C & W’s Application (1914) 31 RPC 235. 
104 (1938) 57 RPC 245 (Morton J) (‘Fishburn’s Application’). 
105 The business method exception to patentability was rejected in the United States in State Street 
Bank & Trust Co. v Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed Cir, 1998) aff’d in 
AT&T Corp v Excel Communications, Inc, 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed Cir, 1999) and In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 
943, 960 (Fed Cir, 2008) (en banc). The State Street decision was followed and its ‘useful, concrete 
and tangible result’ test was endorsed by the Federal Court of Australia in Welcome Real-Time SA v 
Catuity ( 2001) 113 FCR 110, 137 [125]-[126] (Heerey J) and Grant v Commissioner of Patents (2006) 
154 FCR 62, 69 [26]. 
106 Re an Application for a Patent by Fishburn (Fishburn’s Application) (1938) 57 RPC 245, 246. 
107 Ibid 247-8. 
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unpatentable, an alleged invention is not a mere scheme or plan merely because the 
mechanical purpose it serves has useful results when used in connection with a 
business.108 
 
Given that Morton J relied heavily on the decision in Cooper’s Application and did 
not specifically mention physicality as an issue, no firm conclusions can be drawn 
from this opinion as to his Honour’s views on the issue. 
 
H Re GEC’s Application 
 
However, his Honour’s views were quite apparent in Re GEC’s Application.109 In this 
case, Morton J upheld an opposition to a patent for a method of extinguishing fires 
using a known chemical substance because he did not consider that its application 
would result in the production, improvement, restoration or preservation of some 
vendible product. 
 
Morton J sought to create a convenient formula for describing the ‘manner of 
manufacture’ concept. While not claiming to lay down a hard and fast rule applicable 
to all cases, his Honour made the oft-cited proposition, known now as Morton J’s 
rule. Morton J’s rule is that a method or process will be a manufacture if it:  
 
(a) results in the production of some vendible product; or (b) improves or 
restores to its former condition a vendible product; or (c) has the effect of 
preserving from deterioration some vendible product to which it is applied.110  
 
In regard to a physicality requirement, as his Honour did not claim to lay down a hard 
and fast rule, it could be said he was giving only an indication as to the scope of 
patent eligible subject matter. While this formulation is a useful starting point, it has 
been said that if applied literally, it would have a narrowing effect on the law, as was 
acknowledged in the cases that followed.111 The narrow focus of Morton J’s rule is 
now considered by the High Court of Australia in NRDC as having been substantially 
qualified by the comments made in relation to it by Evershed J in Re Two 
Applications for Patents by The Cementation Company, Limited112 and in Re an 
Application for a Patent by Henry Barnato Rantzen,113 and by Lloyd-Jacob J in Re 
Elton and Leda Chemicals Ltd’s Application.114 
 
I The Cementation Company’s Application 
 
In Re Two Applications for Patents by The Cementation Company, Limited,115 
processes for treating a stratum of subterranean soil to prevent subterranean 
combustion by drilling holes in the ground and injecting certain chemical substances 
                                                 
108 Ibid. 
109 (1942) 60 RPC 1 (Morton J).  
110 Ibid 4. 
111 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 276. 
112 (1945) 62 RPC 151. 
113 (1946) 64 RPC 63. 
114 [1957] RPC 267. 
115 (1945) 62 RPC 151 (‘The Cementation Company’s Application’). 
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into them were held to be patentable.116 
 
In allowing the patent, Evershed J was careful not to confer upon Morton J’s rule 
anything near the narrow construction a literal interpretation of its words would give. 
He observed that Morton J had not intended to create a form of words applicable in all 
cases.117 He also noted that Morton J had not intended to limit the understanding of 
‘product’ that results from a ‘manufacture’ to its common meaning, but that it should 
be construed much more broadly. Making reference to the Oxford Dictionary, 
Evershed J thought that the term ‘product’ is wide enough to encompass ‘that which 
is produced by any action, operation or work: a production; the result.’118 
 
Evershed J also observed that Morton J directed his attention to whether, and to what 
extent, the manner of manufacture concept extends to processes not resulting in the 
creation of some new articles or material which did not previously exist; and that the 
emphasis in Morton J’s rule was upon the three activities of production, improvement 
or restoration, and prevention from deterioration. Evershed J noted that Morton J used 
the word ‘product’ in a sense which denoted the subject matter of each of the three 
forms of activity referred to, rather than placing any emphasis on the literal meaning 
of the particular words he used.119 
 
In keeping with his view that patentable subject matter should be interpreted broadly, 
Evershed J was careful that the applicant should be given the benefit of the doubt in 
contentious cases in which the patentability of subject matter is in issue. In allowing 
the patent, he said, ‘it cannot be asserted that [the subject matter of the application] is 
beyond reasonable doubt not a “product” within the terms’ of Morton LJ’s rule.120 
Thus, his Honour clearly envisaged a broad compass of patentable subject matter and 
that the critical test for denying a patent should lie within establishing that the 
invention is new. While he did not say so directly, or even consider the issue, such a 
broad view would be consistent with the view that the scope of patentable subject 
matter is not limited to inventions that produce a physical effect or cause a physical 
transformation of matter.  
 
J Re Rantzen’s Application 
 
In Re an Application for a Patent by Henry Barnato Rantzen,121 Evershed J allowed a 
claim to a method of producing a complex electrical oscillation on the ground that it 
would not be right to hold that an electrical oscillation is not a vendible product.122 
                                                 
116 Ibid 152 (‘the process consists of a method of so treating “a subterranean formation containing 
material liable to combustion” so as to prevent the occurrence of such combustion.’). 
117 Ibid 153. Evershed J, referring to Morton J in Re GEC’s Application, commented that ‘nothing was 
further from his intention than to lay down a rigid form of words which would govern—in substitution, 
as it were, for the language of the Act of Parliament—the grant of protection in all cases of methods or 
processes.’ 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid 154. 
120 Ibid. This is consistent with the view taken by the High Court of Australia in Commissioner of 
Patents v Microcell Ltd (1959) 102 CLR 232, 244-5, in which it decided that the Commissioner ought 
not refuse an application unless it appears practically certain that a patent granted would be held 
invalid. 
121 (1946) 64 RPC 63 (‘Re Rantzen’s Application’). 
122 Ibid 67. See also The Electric Telegraph Co v Brett (1851) 10 CB 838; 138 ER 331 (a method of 
giving duplicate electric signals) and Re Philips Electrical Industries Ltd’s Application for a Patent 
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This is a purely non-physical invention. The only ‘thing’ affected is electrical energy 
when transmitted by wire or wirelessly. 
 
His Honour noted the difficulty of considering electricity as a ‘product’, given its 
intangibility and lack of ‘material content’ and that its transmission does not require 
any ‘material media’, as the oscillation does not require a movement or vibration of a 
medium. It only requires the variation in the momentary voltage from a positive to 
negative charge.123  
 
Notwithstanding this difficulty, Evershed J interpreted Morton J’s use of the word 
‘product’ as being wide enough to corporate electrical energy, despite its non-material 
character, because of its analogy in commercial respects with material commodities. 
Evershed J said that where he spoke of a ‘vendible product’ the proper emphasis of 
such an expression lies upon the trading or industrial character,124 rather than physical 
or material character, which he regarded as not essential: 
 
I conclude, therefore, that it would not be right, nor, as I think, in accordance 
with Morton, J’s intention, to give to the term ‘vendible product’ a narrow or 
rigid construction by placing undue emphasis on the material requirements of 
what may otherwise fairly be regarded as the outcome of a process of 
manufacture.125 
 
His Honour held that the notion of a ‘vendible product’ is not confined to things that 
can be passed from one to another upon a transaction of purchase or sale, but rather 
encompasses anything that might ‘fairly be regarded as the outcome of a process of 
manufacture’.126 Thus, his Honour said: 
 
Nor, when regard is had to everyday usage and terminology, can it be said that 
the notion of electricity as a product which is paid for is, however 
metaphorical, wholly inappropriate and insensible.127 
 
Thus, Evershed J held that the method of producing a complex electrical oscillation is 
indeed a manufacture, in spite of its non-physical nature. 
 
K Re An Application for a Patent by Bovingdon 
 
Re an Application for a Patent by Bovingdon128 involved a method of fumigating 
enclosed spaces to control pests by forming a film of insecticide on the walls and 
other articles located within the space that would cause the destruction of insects and 
other pests therein. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
[1959] RPC 341 (treating visible light as a ‘product’). This decision is clearly inconsistent with the 
majority’s opinion in the United States Federal Circuit decision in In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed 
Cir, 2007). It is, however, arguably consistent with the dissent expressed by Linn J in that case. 
123 Re Rantzen’s Application (1946) 64 RPC 63, 66. 
124 Ibid. See also the use of the expression, ‘industrial or commercial or trading character’ by Lloyd-
Jacob J in Re Lenard’s Application (1954) 71 RPC 190, 192. 
125 Re Rantzen’s Application (1946) 64 RPC 63, 66. 
126 Ibid. 
127 Ibid 67. 
128 (1946) 64 RPC 20 (‘Bovingdon’s Application’).. 
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In a curious decision that is difficult to reconcile with his earlier opinions in The 
Cementation Company’s Application and Re Rantzen’s Application, Evershed J took a 
narrow literal construction of Morton’s rule and determined that the invention at issue 
needed to fit within one the branches of that rule, being whether the method improves 
or protects from deterioration some product. His Honour held that this invention did 
not, and accordingly, found it not be a manner of new manufacture. Evershed J held 
that such a method did not involve an ‘alteration in the structure of the enclosing 
walls of the space or of the articles within it; so that it may be said, within the 
phrasing of the well known GEC case, that it improves or protects from deterioration 
… some ‘product’.’129 
 
In what can only be described as a short, vague and unsatisfactory judgment, his 
Honour said that this invention may perhaps fairly be said to lie somewhere between 
The Cementation Company’s Application on the one hand, and Re GEC’s Application 
on the other, and that ‘the inclination is towards the latter rather than the former.’130 
 
It would appear that his Honour sought to distinguish The Cementation Company’s 
Application on the basis that the application at issue does not result in any 
improvement in or alteration of the structure itself. The decisive factor for his Honour 
appeared to be that no substances were impregnated with the insecticide. Instead, his 
Honour appears to have thought that if the process had involved the impregnation of 
the fabric it would have been a manufacture.131 
 
Evershed J’s careless reasoning in Bovingdon’s Application was followed in Re 
Standard Oil Development Co’s Application132 and Re the Dow Chemical Company’s 
Application for a Patent,133 unnecessarily confusing the law. It could be inferred that 
his Honour’s reasoning in this case may have been responsible for the mistaken belief 
that patents were not available for agricultural and horticultural methods. 
 
L Re Standard Oil Development Co’s Application 
 
In Re Standard Oil Development Co’s Application,134 a patent similar to that 
considered in the NRDC decision was sought for a selective herbicide used in the 
treatment of soil to improve its ability to bear crops. The invention involves applying 
to land and vegetation a herbicidal composition of stated ingredients and amount 
(mixed at a stated temperature) to kill the weeds, but leave the vegetables 
substantially unharmed in order to obtain an improved tract of substantially weed-free 
land.135 
                                                 
129 Ibid 21. 
130 Ibid 22. 
131 Ibid 21-2. 
132 (1951) 68 RPC 114. 
133 [1956] RPC 247. 
134 (1951) 68 RPC 114 (Lloyd-Jacob J). 
135 See also Re Lenard’s Application (1954) 71 RPC 190 (pruning to reduce mortality from disease in 
clove trees) and NV Philips’ Gloeilampenfabrieken Application (1954) 71 RPC 192 (a method for 
producing a new form of poinsettia). Both seem to depend on the view that the process in question was 
only one for altering the conditions of growth, so that the contemplated end result would not be a result 
of the process but would be ‘the inevitable result of that which is inherent in the plant’: (1954) 71 RPC 
192, 194. See also BA’s Application (1915) 32 RPC 348, 348 (the Solicitor General rejected a claim to 
a ‘process of fertilizing the ground “consisting in applying urea nitrate thereto”’ on the grounds that it 
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Two contentions were put forward to support the application. The first contention was 
that the method resulted in the production, improvement, or prevention from 
deterioration, of a vendible product, namely the growing crop. Lloyd-Jacob J, heavily 
influenced by Morton J’s formulation, disposed of this by pointing out that the 
treatment did not produce the crop; secondly, that while there was an improvement, it 
was not the crop but the cultivation that was improved, which might ultimately be 
reflected in the quality and condition of the crop; and thirdly, that since the only direct 
effect of the process was to remove weeds it did not directly preserve the crop from 
deterioration.136 
 
The other contention was that the process is a ‘manufacture’ because it results in a 
product consisting of ‘arable land treated with selective herbicides for the raising of 
vegetables’. In answering this, his Lordship said that the statutory requirement of a 
manner of manufacture is understood to be: 
 
the making of an article or material by physical labour or applied power. 
Unless and until a product of such a making is identifiable it is unnecessary to 
consider by what manner of making it comes into existence.137 
 
His Lordship rejected the contention, first, because the invention does not result in 
land being made; and secondly, because the land would remain unimproved as a 
result of the process.138 His Lordship did not consider that a process for obtaining 
weed-free land might be a commercially valuable vendible product. 
 
Accordingly, Lloyd-Jacob J refused the patent, but was criticised by the High Court in 
NRDC for doing so. The High Court in this regard said the following: 
 
But it seems hardly sufficient to treat a case like this as if it were covered by 
the reasoning of Bovingdon’s Case (1946) 64 RPC 20 and to dismiss it by 
saying that, since the structure of the soil is unaffected by the killing of weeds, 
the process of converting a weed-infested area into a weed-free area is not 
within the notion of ‘manufacture’. Why is it not as completely within it as the 
process of converting a combustible subterranean formation into a non-
combustible formation, or making a building fire-proof? Once it is conceded 
that land may be a ‘product’ within the sense of Morton J.’s ‘rule’ as now 
understood, and that accordingly a process for improving it may be a 
‘manufacture’ in the relevant sense of the word – and Lloyd-Jacob J. did not 
question this –  a considerable step seems to have been taken towards 
establishing that an artificial process for suppressing unwanted forms of 
growth which impede the profitable use of land may be within the concept.139 
 
                                                                                                                                            
was nothing but a claim to a new use of an old substance’); Re the Dow Chemical Company's 
Application for a Patent [1956] RPC 247; Re Canterbury Agricultural College's Application (1958) 
RPC 85. 
136 Re Standard Oil Development Co’s Application (1951) 68 RPC 114, 115.  
137 Ibid 115-6. 
138 Ibid 116 (‘In the present case, the land remains unaltered. Some of the herbs in or upon it are 
affected’, but the land is ‘merely the carrier both of crop and herbage and plays no part in the operation 
by which they are selectively affected.’). 
139 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 274. 
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Re Standard Oil Development Co’s Application has been cited as authority for the 
proposition that an invention must involve a tangible product if it is to be a ‘manner 
of manufacture’.140 It would, however, appear that this is not a correct reading of the 
law given the more expansive view of the term ‘vendible product’ that came to be 
endorsed in subsequent cases beginning with Re Elton and Leda Chemicals Ltd’s 
Application, and the High Court’s criticism of the decision in NRDC. 
 
M Re the Dow Chemical Company’s Application for a Patent 
 
Re the Dow Chemical Company’s Application for a Patent,141 concerned a similar 
application involving a soil sterilisation method used to prevent the growth of 
germinative seeds in seed-infected soils.142 The object of the treatment is to enable 
crops to be grown in soil. The difference between this method and the method 
considered in Re Standard Oil Development Co’s Application is that this method was 
designed to prevent the growth of germinative seeds, whereas the method considered 
in Re Standard Oil Development Co’s Application was designed to kill weeds while 
they grew.143 The argument in favour of the patent was that ‘[i]f you have a bag of 
soil and treat it in a certain way to sterilize it you get a vendible product’ that is 
clearly a manner of manufacture.144 
 
The Superintending Examiner held the method to be unpatentable on the basis that the 
treatment does not alter the physical structure of the soil, but rather has the effect of 
rendering harmless any seeds or parasites that had infected the soil. While the soil 
here is the carrier of the weeds or seeds, it plays no part in the operation of the 
method. The case was treated as being distinguishable from The Cementation 
Company’s Application for the reason that the subterranean formation in that case 
involves a modified or improved structure, whereas in the present case the soil itself is 
unchanged. It was instead likened to the applications refused in Bovingdon’s 
Application and Re Standard Oil Development Co’s Application. The Superintending 
Examiner chose these precedents because in the application in question, ‘the soil 
structure is unchanged’.145  
 
The seedicide is applied to the seed infected soil in the same way as the 
insecticide is applied to the insect infested buildings in Bovingdon’s 
Application, without in any way modifying or altering the soil apart from 
killing the seeds therein. The present case, to my mind, is closer to 
Bovingdon’s Application and Re Standard Oil Development Coy.’s 
Application than it is to Cementation Coy. Ld.’s Application.146 
 
Thus, he favoured a physicality requirement. This finding is curious given that in the 
method upheld in The Cementation Company’s Application the soil structure was also 
unchanged. This, however, is now largely academic, as the decision in Re the Dow 
                                                 
140 Monotti, above n 12, 463; Mark Davidson, Ann Monotti and Leanne Wiseman, Australian 
Intellectual Property Law (2008) 407. 
141 [1956] RPC 247. 
142 Note that the term used in the judgment is indeed ‘seed-infected soils’, not seed-infested soils.  
143 Re the Dow Chemical Company's Application for a Patent [1956] RPC 247, 251. 
144 Ibid 248. 
145 Ibid 253.  
146 Ibid. Note the similarity in the reasoning in Bovingdon’s Application (1946) 64 RPC 20. 
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Chemical Company’s Application for a Patent was one of those criticised and not 
followed by the High Court in NRDC.147 
 
N Re Elton and Leda Chemicals Ltd’s Application 
 
This narrow view of manufacture was overturned in Re Elton and Leda Chemicals 
Ltd’s Application.148 This case involved a patent for a method of dispersing fog by 
introducing a surface-active agent in the form of a smoke or spray into the fog in 
order to remove or lower the electric charge carried by the surfaces of the droplets, 
causing them to coalesce and precipitate as rain or drizzle. The utility of the invention 
is in its application to produce a fog-free atmosphere, say on a runway, or to 
deliberately induce rainfall. 
 
Here we have an indication that the ‘product’ referred to in Morton J’s rule, when 
used to denote a process, requires only something in which ‘some new and useful 
effect’ may be observed, rather than a physicality requirement. In considering the 
patent, Lloyd-Jacob J said: 
 
There has been no question, at any rate since before the year 1800, that the 
expression ‘manner of manufacture’ in the Statute of James I must be 
construed in the sense of including a practice of making as well as the means 
of making and the product of making. It has thus been appreciated that, 
although an inventor may use no newly devised mechanism, nor produce a 
new substance, none the less he may, by providing some new and useful 
effect, appropriate for himself a patent monopoly in such improved result by 
covering the mode or manner by means of which his result is secured. Seeing 
that the promise which he offers is some new and useful effect, there must of 
necessity be some product whereby the validity of his promise can be 
tested.149 
 
Lloyd-Jacob J thus equated the term ‘vendible’ with things of commercial value, 
consistent with his earlier use of the expression, ‘industrial or commercial or trading 
character’ in Re Lenard’s Application.150 In this regard he said the following: 
 
Applied with a little latitude it might afford some assistance in the present 
case, for a fog-free atmosphere or a deliberately induced rainfall could be a 
factor in the site value of the land whereon the Applicants’ process was 
applied. Pure air or abundant water may not by present commercial practice be 
vendible as such, but they may well enter indirectly into estimations of 
commercial value.151 
 
Given that the subject matter in question in this case involved the dispersion of fog, 
which entails a physical effect, there is only so much this decision can inform us of 
the need for such a requirement. What it does tell us can be sourced from the broad 
                                                 
147 See NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 274 and above n 139. 
148 [1957] RPC 267. 
149 Ibid 268-9. 
150 (1954) 71 RPC 190, 192 (which involved an application in respect of pruning to reduce mortality in 
clove trees caused by disease). 
151 Re Elton and Leda Chemicals Ltd's Application [1957] RPC 267, 269. 
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formulation given to the concept of ‘vendibility’ by Lloyd-Jacob J. By equating 
‘vendible’ with things of commercial value, Lloyd-Jacob J indicated that the manner 
of manufacture concept extends beyond the bounds of material and physical 
constraints.  
 
O Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corp’s Application 
 
In Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corp’s Application,152 Lloyd-Jacob J explained that 
the presentation of information recorded in or on a physical medium is not patentable, 
in and of itself. His Honour made clear that any intellectual, informational or visual 
content attached to a physical medium lies within the realm of the ‘fine arts’ and not 
the ‘useful arts’, and that it is the ‘useful arts’ and not the ‘fine arts’ that patent law 
protects.153  
 
He clarified that the involvement of some physical apparatus in the presentation of 
information will not prevent it falling within the scope of the ‘fine arts’, unless the 
information itself automatically fulfils some mechanical, industrial or otherwise 
commercial purpose. 
 
Even where such information is of importance in describing or defining an 
operation to be performed on some apparatus it cannot be regarded as part of 
the performance itself and thus qualify as a manner of manufacture. If 
however the marks as such are described to operate through appropriate means 
automatically to fulfil a commercial purpose, whether the means are 
mechanical, optical or electrical, they can properly be regarded as an integral 
part of a manner of manufacture and as such fit subject matter for patent 
claims.154  
 
This case confirms the earlier precedents in Fishburn’s Application and Cooper’s 
Application that any presentation of information characterised solely by the content of 
the information has traditionally been not patentable.155 
 
P Rolls-Royce Limited’s Application 
 
In Rolls-Royce Limited’s Application156 a method of operating an aircraft so as to 
reduce noise levels during take-off was rejected for being a mere scheme or plan. The 
method involved the pilot of an aircraft powered with gas turbine engines, inter alia, 
increasing the effective area of the final jet nozzle shortly after take-off to increase the 
mass overflow through the by-pass duct, thereby reducing the noise emitted by the jet 
                                                 
152 [1958] RPC 35.  
153 Ibid 36. 
154 Ibid; cited in NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 275. 
155 See also Pitman’s Application (1969) 86 RPC 646, where an arrangement of printed words for 
teaching pronunciation of language was thought to have a mechanical purpose, whereas any matter 
having a purely intellectual, literary or artistic connotation was thought to not be patentable; and Moore 
Business Forms Application [1979] AOJP 2521, where a claim to a business form having printed 
transverse bars was allowed because the bars served the purpose of allowing the form to be printed 
with more lines of type per inch which would still be as easy to read as prior forms having the usual 
number of lines of type per inch. 
156 [1963] RPC 251. 
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nozzle. No modification of the aircraft itself resulted from the employment of the 
claimed method. 
 
Justice Lloyd-Jacob held that this method is not patentable, being merely ‘the 
disclosure of a general flight plan directing the initial operational movements of an 
aircraft between take-off and the commencement of free-flying conditions’. He 
dispelled any notion that this might be patentable subject matter by saying, ‘this in my 
judgment is as much outside the operation of any of the useful arts as would be a 
trainer’s direction to a jockey in his control of a racehorse’.157 The alleged invention 
was held to not be either a new machine or process or an old machine giving a new 
and improved result.  
 
It seems that the alleged invention in Rolls-Royce Limited’s Application was refused 
because it is no more than information or instructions which could be given to a pilot 
on how to operate a known machine on which he might, or might not, act. One can 
only speculate on the significance of the comparison drawn between the claimed 
method and a method of instructing a jockey. This might indicate that the patent was 
rejected on the basis that the method was not sufficiently described or that it could not 
reliably be replicated time and again. That is, it consists of information that could be 
applied in a process involving human-decision making. Such a process cannot be 
guaranteed to produce stable, consistent and predictable results because of the human 
element involved.  
 
Additionally, the patent was thought to be ‘generally inconvenient’ on the basis that 
pilots should not face the burden of concern that they may be infringing a patent 
monopoly while operating standard engine controls and conducting the potentially 
dangerous undertaking of flying.158 
 
The issue of ‘general inconvenience’ aside, it is difficult to say how his Lordship’s 
objection can be described. There is little emphasis on the need for a physicality 
requirement. The method in question does not involve a transformation of a physical 
object, as it involves no modification of the aircraft itself, although it does involve the 
use of a physical device, being an aircraft. The objection seems to be the fact that the 
alleged invention consists of a procedure a pilot in control of an aircraft could choose 
to follow, either in whole or only partially, as that person desires.  
 
IV OBSERVATIONS OF THE PRE-NRDC CASE LAW 
 
There are a number of observations to be made from the historical survey of the pre-
NRDC case law undertaken in the previous section of this article. The first is the very 
general and uncontroversial observation that patent law in Australia protects the 
products of intellectual effort and human ingenuity that fall within the useful arts and 
are of practical utility and economic significance.  
 
That the scope of patentable subject matter includes vendible products of economic 
significance, and involves the practical application of ideas or principles to produce a 
useful result, is evident in almost all the cases examined dating back to Boulton and 
                                                 
157 Ibid 253.  
158 Ibid 256. 
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Watt v Bull and The King v Wheeler. However, this view of the law is not evident in 
all the cases. In some cases, this view is displaced in favour of a more restrictive 
requirement, that an invention be directed to utility of a chemical or mechanical 
nature.159 While the scope of patentable subject matter certainly includes inventions 
of a mechanical nature, since cases such as Re C & W’s Application, it would seem to 
have been made clear that the focus of patentable subject matter is in law broader than 
this. 
 
While none of the cases preceding NRDC specifically address the issue of whether the 
‘manner of manufacture’ test contains a physicality requirement, they contain strong 
indications that physical effect or transformation is not a prerequisite to patent 
eligibility. They establish that processes are certainly patentable subject matter if they 
are the result of a principle or idea having been reduced so as to achieve a specific 
result and are embodied in physical objects or substances. The cases make clear that 
there can be no patent for a mere principle or idea because principles and ideas are not 
inventions. However, that does not mean that non-physical processes are necessarily 
excluded as unpatentable principles or abstract ideas. In fact, most judges do not 
appear to have considered the possibility of non-physical processes, let alone sought 
to exclude them from the bounds of patentable subject matter. Instead, the cases show 
that the presence of a physical effect or transformation of matter is merely an example 
of one form that patentable subject matter may take, rather than an invariable 
requirement. 
 
These are solid and established principles of patent law. They date back to the earliest 
cases that consider the concept of manufacture in the late eighteenth century, Boulton 
and Watt v Bull and The King v Wheeler.160 These principles are also supported by the 
more recent cases, including: Re C & W’s Application; the cases decided by Evershed 
J, The Cementation Company’s Application and Re Rantzen’s Application, in which 
his Honour described the question of whether an invention requires a physical or 
material character as not important; and the Elton and Leda Chemicals Case in which 
Lloyd-Jacob J equated ‘vendible’ with things of commercial value, thereby indicating 
that the concept of vendibility extends beyond the bounds of material and physical 
constraints.161  
 
In contrast, there are only a handful of cases which might indicate that the law may 
contain a physicality requirement, all of which have been overruled. These are 
Cooper’s Application, where Sir Robert Finlay A-G appears to have found in favour 
of a physicality requirement by his statement that, ‘[t]he subject with reference to 
which you must apply for a Patent must be one which results in a material product of 
some substantial character’;162 the decisions of Morton J in Fishburn’s Application 
and Re GEC’s Application (Morton J’s ‘rule’ requiring a vendible product) which 
                                                 
159 Cooper’s Application (1901) 19 RPC 53; Rogers v Commissioner of Patents (1910) 10 CLR 701 
(Griffith CJ and O’Connor J); Fishburn’s Application (1938) 57 RPC 245. 
160 See also Househill Iron Co v Neilson (1843) 1 Web Pat Cas 673 in which the House of Lords 
confirmed the approach taken by Alderson B in Jupe v Pratt (1837) 1 Web Pat Cas 144 that all abstract 
principles may be patentable, subject to their having been directed to a practical application. 
161 See also Rogers v Commissioner of Patents (1910) 10 CLR 701 (Isaacs J) (dissent); Cornish v 
Keene (1837) 132 ER 530, 536, where it was held that production of a vendible article is sufficient test 
of patentability, but not the only test. 
162 Cooper’s Application (1901) 19 RPC 53, 54. Equally, it could be said that his Honour in this case 
was not in favour of physicality requirement. It is simply too difficult to say one way or the other. 
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were held in NRDC to be too narrow an interpretation if read literally;163 Maeder v 
Busch (which contains Dixon J’s obiter dicta referring to the need for a ‘tangible 
thing’); and the horticulture cases, Bovingdon’s Application; Re Standard Oil 
Development Co’s Application; and Re the Dow Chemical Company’s Application for 
a Patent, which were overruled by the High Court in NRDC. A small number of the 
cases examined, namely, Virginia-Carolina Chemical Corporation’s Application and 
Rolls-Royce Limited’s Application do not appear to indicate either the presence or 
absence of a physicality requirement. 
 
Then, there is NRDC itself. Although the judges in NRDC said that the question of 
whether a non-physical invention is patentable subject matter remained undecided,164 
the answer is evident in the High Court’s reasoning. The beauty of the NRDC 
approach to the manner of manufacture question is its flexibility and ability to adapt 
to ‘excitingly unpredictable’ changes in technology.165 The difficulty is that it is tough 
to identify restrictions on the scope of patentable subject matter that can be easily 
applied on a case-by-case basis. However, that is the nature of the patentable subject 
matter standard in all jurisdictions. The only categories of excluded matter recognised 
in NRDC are mere principles, abstract ideas and discoveries, and matter that lies 
outside the useful arts. That excluded matter does not include non-physical 
inventions, since non-physical inventions are not necessarily mere principles, 
discoveries or abstract ideas. Accordingly, it must be said that the reasoning and 
decision in NRDC is entirely consistent with the cases preceding it, which create a 
patentable subject matter inquiry that does not make reference to physical effect or 
transformation.166 Rather, those principles show that the boundary between patentable 
subject matter and abstract ideas or principles is specific practical application, not 
physicality. 
 
Although the Full Court’s observation in Grant that the patentability of non-physical 
methods has never been upheld in the pre-NRDC case law is accurate, it is another 
thing entirely to infer that the concept of ‘manufacture’ is limited to the protection of 
inventions embodied in physical objects or physically-transformative methods. The 
Full Court erred by inferring that a line of cases involving largely inventions 
comprising some physical or corporeal embodiment necessarily means that 
physicality is a prerequisite to patentability. Accordingly, it is argued that the Federal 
Court’s finding in Grant is not good law and should not be followed. 
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
This article has focused on the fact that the ‘manner of manufacture’ test as developed 
through the pre-NRDC case law, is broad, flexible, inclusive and technology-neutral. 
It recognises that the products of technological innovation will always be ‘excitingly 
                                                 
163 In fairness to Morton J, given that his Honour in Re GEC’s Application indicated that he did not 
intend to lay down a hard-and-fast rule, it is difficult to ascribe to him an intention to limit patent-
eligibility with a physicality requirement. 
164 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 270. 
165 Ibid 271 [EDITOR: The reference to p 271 is to the reference in NRDC to ‘excitingly 
unpredicable’]. 
166 See Ben McEniery, ‘Patents for Intangible Inventions in Australia After Grant v Commissioner of 
Patents (Part 1)’, above n 11. 
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unpredictable’,167 and that such an approach is needed to appropriately recognise and 
protect new and emerging technologies.  
 
The pre-NRDC cases examined show that the focus of the patentable subject matter 
inquiry is practical utility and economic significance rather than physical 
embodiment. They demonstrate that this is an established common law principle that 
dates back to the earliest cases dealing with the concept of ‘manufacture’. The view 
taken is that the pre-NRDC cases are all consistent with the finding in NRDC itself, 
that the Australian patentable subject matter test is a broad, flexible, inclusive and 
technology-neutral standard.  
 
This article disrupts the tenor of the Federal Court’s decision in Grant, which is based 
upon the assertion that the physicality requirement it established is consistent with the 
existing case law. Instead, the historical survey of the cases undertaken indicates that 
the pre-NRDC case law, like NRDC itself, does not support the physicality 
requirement created in Grant. On the contrary, the argument made is that those 
principles show that the boundary between patentable subject matter and abstract 
ideas or principles is specific practical application. Rather than being a prerequisite to 
patentability, a physical effect or transformation is merely an indication, or ‘clue’, that 
the subject matter is patent eligible. While it is clear that the patent system exists to 
protect and encourage the creation of new and useful physical machines and devices 
and new methods that physically transform matter from one state into another, the 
cases show that this is not the extent of the patent incentive. As such, it is not only the 
traditionally recognised mechanical, industrial, chemical and manufacturing processes 
that are patent eligible. Patent eligible subject matter also encompasses non-physical 
inventions. Accordingly, this article provides further reasons, in addition to those set 
out by the author in the earlier academic literature,168 to support the argument that the 
Federal Court’s finding in Grant is not good law and should not be followed. 
 
 
                                                 
167 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 271. 
168 See McEniery, ‘Patents for Intangible Inventions in Australia After Grant v Commissioner of 
Patents (Part 1)’, above n 11; McEniery, ‘Patents for Intangible Inventions in Australia After Grant v 
Commissioner of Patents (Part 2)’, above n 11; McEniery, ‘The Patentability of Non-Physical 
Inventions: Lessons From the United States’, above n 3 
